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Introduction 
 
According to Plato’s Timaeus our world was constituted and arranged in the best possible 
way by a divine craftsman (the Demiurge). Plato represents the Demiurge as being guided by his 
own planning or calculation (logismos, Tim. 30b, 34a-b) about how to bring about maximally 
good order in the cosmos he produces. Indeed, it seems that the Demiurge’s causal power with 
respect to our cosmos is labelled ‘foresight’ or ‘providence’ (pronoia, Tim. 30b-c) precisely to 
reflect the claim that benevolent divine planning is explanatory of various features of the 
physical world.2 Among Platonists of the early empire, planning was widely understood (on 
Plato’s authority) to be an integral aspect of the Demiurge’s creative activity. Plotinus, however, 
dissents sharply from the earlier Platonist tradition on this point. He argues that divine reason 
(nous) cannot make plans of any sort concerning the physical cosmos, or indeed entertain any 
thoughts whatsoever about physical realities. This leaves Plotinus with the challenge of 
developing an alternative account of how divine intellectual activity determines and 
guarantees—as he affirms it does—a ‘providentially’ optimal world-order. 
 The bulk of this paper will discuss Plotinus’ case against the view that the cosmos is the 
product of Demiurgic planning and the alternative account of divine providence that he proposes 
in that view’s stead. But it will be useful to begin by briefly focusing attention on the picture of 
divine planning presented in the Timaeus, because Plotinus’ dissenting story about providence 
can plausibly be taken to be motivated by a desire to resolve tensions internal to Platonism that 
arise in connection with this picture. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We wish to thank audiences at the LMU-München and at a conference at the CNRS Centre Jean Pépin in Paris 
(organized by Meryem Sebti and Daniel de Smet) for valuable discussion of this paper, and Peter Adamson for 
helpful written comments on an early draft.   
2 Cf. Tim. 44c, 45a-b. 
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In the Timaeus, the Demiurge is initially confronted with pre-cosmic stuff in a disorderly 
state; and since he is good, he desires to make everything that exists (including this stuff) as good 
as possible. To this end, he decides to construct a cosmos endowed with soul and intelligence 
(30b-c); and since the cosmos is to be a living being, he selects the “complete living being” as 
the appropriate intelligible model after which to fashion the cosmos (27d-29a, 30c-31b).3 In 
making these and other arrangements for the structure and constitution of the world and its parts, 
both the Demiurge and the ‘lesser gods’ – to whom he delegates the creation of mortal beings – 
are guided by their thoughts about how to bring about the best cosmic order and well-designed 
organisms. In Plato’s own account there is some obscurity about the respective contributions of 
the intelligible model and of god’s planning activity to particular features of the sensible 
cosmos.4 Still, it is clear is that basic to Plato’s conception of the divine planning are (i) that it is 
thought about the sensible cosmos, (ii) that this thought involves the discovery of means to ends, 
and (iii) that it is directed towards prospective states of affairs (as its description as ‘forethought’ 
suggests). Plotinus, however, does not accept that the divine thought responsible for cosmic 
order could have any of these features, and accordingly denies that the cosmos is the product of 
planning. 
Plotinus’ case against divine planning rests upon a set of assumptions that hail in part 
from the Timaeus itself and its tradition of interpretation. Among these, of particular importance 
are the Platonist identifications of the Demiurge with a divine intellect and of the intelligible 
model that the Demiurge looks to with the Platonic Forms.5 These two interpretative claims 
appear to have been widely regarded as compatible with the thesis that god plans certain features 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The “complete living being” that the Demiurge uses as a model is apparently the Form of Animal, which is 
“complete” in virtue of being the whole of the kind animal, rather than any of the specific animal kinds that are its 
parts (Tim. 30c). The Timaeus leaves unresolved how the design of the physical cosmos might reflect the population 
of the intelligible world more generally. 
4 In the Timaeus, some features of the cosmos evidently reflect the Demiurge’s desire to instantiate what is already 
given in his model, but planning is also required to work out how features of the model are to be best approximated 
in a physical medium; other features here may well not represent attempts to copy any feature of the model. This left 
wide room for variation in ancient interpretations of the Demiurge; at one extreme, the early Stoics were inspired by 
the Timaeus to identify the benevolence of their divine craftsman entirely with his providential reasoning about the 
best disposition for the cosmos, even though they dismissed the notion that the cosmos has an intelligible model (see 
Powers 2013).  
5 The identification of the Forms (collectively) with the Demiurge’s model finds support in the causal role other 
Platonic texts accord to a wide array of Forms. 
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of the sensible cosmos.6 By contrast, Plotinus reaches the conclusion that, once other Platonic 
commitments are taken properly into account, the identification of the Demiurge with a divine 
intellect and of the model for the sensible cosmos with the Forms leaves no place for divine 
planning in cosmology (or, indeed, for the Demiurge to have any intentions whatsoever 
regarding the sensible world). Faced with this result, Plotinus proposes that all references to 
planning in the Timaeus are to be taken metaphorically, as Plato’s way of indicating that the 
cosmos, since it is as good as it can be, accords with the arrangement at which a divine designer 
would have arrived, had the cosmos in fact been the product of planning.7  
 
The Framework for Plotinus’ Views About Providence 
 
Before turning to Plotinus’ arguments against the view that the Demiurge engages in 
planning the cosmos, it will be helpful to briefly orient ourselves to the place of the Demiurge 
and his creation in Plotinus’ metaphysics, and to articulate the further commitments that serve as 
the basis for those arguments. 
 Plotinus maintains that the whole of reality derives from a perfectly simple first principle 
identified as ‘the One’ or ‘the Good’. This first principle, the One, generates a divine Intellect 
(nous) that thinks the Platonic Forms, which also constitute its substance, so that Plotinus’ divine 
Intellect is, like Aristotle’s, a self-thinker. This Intellect in turn generates Soul. Finally, one 
particular soul, the so-called World-Soul (and specifically, its nutritive faculty, Nature), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Middle Platonist authors widely adopt the Timaeus’ characterizations of the Demiurge as planning the cosmos and 
its soul, often repeating Plato’s own examples without any evident qualms: see e.g. Philo of Alexandria, De op. 
mund. 16 ff.; Apuleius, De Platone 1.8, 1.10; Atticus, fr. 6.6-9 des Places; Plutarch, De an. procr. 1025a-f, 1027a, 
De sera 550d-e; and Alcinous, Didask. 12.2-3, 14.4; cf. Galen Hipp. et Plat. 7.5.21. The state of our evidence makes 
it difficult to determine whether the absence of explicit references to planning in other authors reflects dissent on 
this point. For providence in Middle Platonism, see Dragona-Monachou 1994, Mansfeld 1999, and Sharples 2003. 
For Platonists on the Demiurge, see Opsomer 2005.  
7  III.2.14.1-6; V.8.7.36-44; VI.2.21.32-37; VI.7.1.28-32; VI.8.17.1-4; cf. III.2.3.6-9. Plotinus also appears to 
interpret the claim that Demiurge desires to create because he is without envy (phthonos, Tim. 29e) metaphorically. 
True to the letter of the Timaeus, he describes the productive activity of intelligible entities as a manifestation of 
their lack of ‘envy’ (IV.8.4.1-10; IV.8.6.1-18; V.4.1.34-36). But since, in the cases of his first principle (the One) 
and of nous, this production involves no desire to produce their product (III.2.2.10-12), Plotinus construes this 
language in non-intentional terms; cf. his qualifications of the claim that they lack envy (hoion, IV.8.6.12; hôsper, 
V.4.1.35), his application of this description to a radiant light source (IV.8.4.3-5), and more generally his use of 
inanimate entities (e.g. fire’s warming and snow’s cooling) to illustrate the productive activity of intelligible entities 
(cf. e.g. IV.5.7; V.1.3; V.1.6; V.3.7; V.4.1).  
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generates the sensible cosmos by producing matter and imparting form to it. At each stage of this 
causal sequence the producer timelessly generates its product (whole-cloth, as it were) as a 
necessary outcome of its own essential activity – a causal pattern typically labeled ‘emanation’ 
(from Plotinus’ images of the product ‘flowing from’ its cause) or ‘double-activity’ (with 
reference to Plotinus’ distinction between the energeia that is intrinsic to the cause and the 
energeia that constitutes the product). In this scheme, the Demiurge is (for Plotinus as for 
Platonists before him) identified with the divine Intellect; and his role in creating the physical 
cosmos is mediated by the activity of the World-Soul he creates. 
This Plotinian interpretation of the broad structure of Platonist metaphysics represents in 
certain ways a departure from earlier mainstream Platonist views. Most conspicuously, Plotinus’ 
view that the highest god is a principle prior to divine nous (the One) and his theory of 
‘emanation’ are exceptional. Yet the basic commitments that underlie Plotinus’ arguments 
against divine planning each enjoyed some measure of acceptance among his Platonist 
predecessors, and the battery of arguments that proceed from them, taken together, present a 
forceful challenge to the compatibility of divine planning with other Platonist principles. These 
commitments are as follows: 
 
C1: Two-Worlds Epistemology   
 
Only Forms can be objects of knowledge; physical realities, with which we are 
acquainted through sense-perception, are objects of an inferior mode of cognition: mere 
belief or opinion (doxa).  
 
The locus classicus for this two-worlds epistemology is Plato’s account of knowledge and 
belief in Republic V-VI. According to the argument in Republic V, knowledge (epistêmê) has as 
its object Forms, whereas opinion (doxa) has as its object sensibles. This epistemic schema is 
further refined in the simile of the divided line in Republic VI, where Plato designates the 
cognitive state consisting of the apprehension of intelligible objects as noêsis.8 As we shall see 
below, this epistemological picture raises a difficulty about how divine nous can reflect upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Rep. 508d, where the soul’s apprehension of intelligible objects is designated nous in contrast to doxa of 
sensible items; and Tim. 27d ff. Cf. V.9.7. 
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how sensible reality should be disposed; for the epistemic states most plausibly attributed to 
divine nous, knowledge (epistêmê) and understanding (noêsis), are directed solely towards 
intelligible reality and do not concern the sensible realm at all.9  
 
C2: The Perfect Actuality of Divine Nous  
 
Divine nous is a fully actual self-thinker.  
 
This view of nous owes an obvious debt to the account of divine nous in Metaphysics 12, 
where Aristotle argues that god is a fully actual self-thinking intellect. But Plotinus cannot reach 
his conception of divine nous via the strategy Aristotle pursues there, because Aristotle deduces 
that god has these attributes in a series of arguments built around the common premise that god 
is the very best thing (a status that does not apply in Plotinus’ view to nous, but rather to his 
highest god, ‘the One’ or ‘the Good’).10 Instead, like Aristotle in DA 3.5, Plotinus proceeds from 
the assumption that there must be some nous that knows in full actuality in virtue of its essence; 
the existence of a nous of this sort is necessary as a cause of the actualization of knowing in 
merely potential knowers.11 While there is some dispute about what the nous of DA III.5 knows 
and how it relates to the divine nous of Metaphysics 12, for Plotinus the actual nous that is the 
cause of knowing in us is the divine nous that thinks the Forms, and it is able to serve as a cause 
for the actualization of knowledge in potential knowers (i.e. souls) precisely because it contains 
all knowledge in actuality (V.9.4). Moreover, Plotinus contends that nous’ possession of 
knowledge in virtue of its essence implies that the beings it knows are internal to it and, indeed, 
that nous’ knowledge and the beings it knows must be one and the same. For if nous were other 
than its objects of thought, it would not know in virtue of its essence, but instead be a potential 
knower brought to actuality by something else (V.9.5.1-10). In this way, Plotinus reaches the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Although Aristotle likewise accepts that nous has as its object noêta rather than aisthêta (DA 3.4, 429a13-18), this 
thesis does not imply a two-worlds epistemology, as the noêta acquired by scientific inquiry are attained via 
perception and concern aspects of sensible reality (An. post. 2.19). 
10 Aristotle’s arguments in Metaphysics 12 are, however, an effective critique against Platonists who identify as the 
highest god a Demiurge who engages in cosmic planning. Aristotle argues that, since god’s activity must be the very 
best activity, he will engage exclusively in an activity of theoretical contemplation (theôria), and that this activity is 
wholly devoid of change. Such considerations provide reasons to doubt that the planning of mundane affairs befits 
the highest divinity; cf. Sedley 2007: 169-71. 
11 For Aristotelian influences on Plotinus’ theory of nous, see Menn 2001: 235-39.  
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view that nous’ thought consists in the necessarily complete and comprehensive theoretical 
contemplation of its own substance (i.e. the Forms).12 As we shall see below, this conception of 
nous will be an important basis for Plotinus’ denial of planning to nous. For Plotinus takes 
planning to involve consideration of non-actual states of affairs; but since nous necessarily thinks 
only actual beings, it is impossible for it to consider such objects.  
 
C3: The Eternity of the Cosmos 
 
The physical cosmos had no beginning in time, but is rather the eternal product of nous’ 
activity.  
 
According to the Timaeus, the cosmos had a beginning in time, and there was controversy 
among ancient Platonists as to whether this claim is to be interpreted literally or not. ‘Literalists’ 
about creation maintain that that there is a temporal beginning for the cosmos, whereas ‘non-
literalists’ about creation maintain that the cosmos is eternal and that Plato speaks as if the 
cosmos had a temporal beginning solely for expository purposes. 13  This debate between 
literalists and non-literalists has implications for divine planning. If planning involves the 
discovery of means to ends, and the resulting plan can be implemented only after such discovery 
has occurred, then only literalists about creation in time are well-positioned to claim that the 
permanent features of the cosmos are planned—whether this planning is conducted by divine 
nous or by some other divine entity (e.g. the World Soul). 
 
The Case Against Divine Planning 
 
Plotinus occasionally appeals to C3 as sufficient to establish the claim that the cosmos is 
not a product of divine planning: since the cosmos has always existed, there was no time before 
the cosmos existed when it could have been planned out in advance (III.2.1.15-26, VI.8.17.1-9). 
But in the opening chapters of Ennead VI.7, How the Multitude of Forms Came into Being and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Plotinus also has epistemological grounds for identifying nous with its objects: if they were not the same, nous 
would not grasp the intelligible things themselves, but rather have mere ‘impressions’ of them (V.3.5.21-29; cf. 
V.5.1.50-68); see Emilsson 2007: ch. 3. 
13 For these ‘literalist’ and ‘non-literalist’ interpretations, see Baltes 1976 and Sorabji 1983: 268-283.  
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On the Good, Plotinus offers a far more ambitious and thoroughgoing series of arguments 
against divine planning.14  
Plotinus’ discussion takes its point of departure from the case of sight and eyes, which 
figure prominently in the Timaeus as examples of the kinds of abilities and organs that divine 
reason confers on animals to ensure that they can survive and flourish.15 The clear implication of 
the Timaeus’s account is that divine reason, in determining that animals are to have features such 
as eyes, took into consideration which features would be useful to animals in negotiating their 
physical surroundings.16 Plotinus, however, sharply rejects the implication that the Demiurge 
literally engages in planning out eyes or any other features of the sensible cosmos. After raising a 
preliminary query about whether the Demiurge should be thought to confer just sense-organs or 
also the sense-perceptual capacities that are active through them (VI.7.1.10-21), Plotinus 
proceeds to offer a set of complementary arguments for the claim that the Demiurge’s creative 
activity cannot involve anything like means-end reasoning about the sensible cosmos. 
 The first argument (VI.7.1.21 ff.) attacks the idea that divine nous is in a position to think 
about sensible reality at all. Plotinus begins by granting, for the sake of the argument, that divine 
nous could engage in discursive reasoning (logismos). This is not (as we shall see below) a 
supposition that Plotinus himself accepts; but even if it were true, Plotinus says, divine nous 
could not arrive by such reasoning at conclusions about perceptible, physical items. This is 
because a reasoner must start from premises about perceptible items in order to reach 
conclusions about perceptible items; but nous, since it lacks perception, has no access to such 
premises.17 Instead, nous only has intelligible items (noêta) as premises and can, accordingly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For a complementary treatment of Enn. VI.7 that focuses on its engagement with the earlier Platonist and 
Peripatetic traditions, see Chiaradonna 2015 in this volume. 
15 “Did the God [i.e. the Demiurge] or one of the gods [i.e. the ‘lesser gods’], when sending souls to birth, put ‘light-
bearing eyes’ in the face and give them the other organs for each of the senses because he foresaw that safety would 
be ensured in this way, if one saw and heard beforehand and by touching could avoid one thing and pursue 
another?” (VI.7.1.1-5) Given that Plotinus goes on to deny that the god or gods did in fact confer eyes for the safety 
of organisms here, it seems preferable not to translate this sentence (pace Armstrong) as an assertion.  
16 Although the explicit rationale in the Timaeus for giving human beings eyes is above all to facilitate the soul’s 
attainment of wisdom (Tim. 47a-c), the proposal that eyes are given for survival is perfectly consonant with the 
Timaeus’ general outlook that bodily structures are designed with a view to the preservation of embodied life (cf. 
Tim. 33a, 45d-e, 72e-74e). 
17 Thaler 2011: 163-4 takes the argument to be that nous lacks ‘aisthêsis’ in the sense that it fails to have a general 
concept of sense-perception, and so, cannot reason about a particular sense modality (e.g. hearing or sight). But 
Hadot 1988: 197-8 is surely right to take Plotinus’ point to be that nous lacks a capacity for sense-perception, and 
accordingly, lacks appropriate starting points for drawing conclusions about sensible reality (cf. VI.7.1.25-8). 
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only draw conclusions about noêta. In this argument Plotinus assumes, first and explicitly, that 
nous does not have the capacity for sense-perception (which is posterior to nous; cf. ‘not yet’, 
VI.7.1.24); and, second (albeit implicitly), that noêta do not have as their contents facts about 
sensible reality. Neither of these assumptions is here defended by Plotinus, but both derive 
support from (C1), since that view denies to nous epistemic states associated with perception, 
and holds that nous’ proper objects (noêta) are Forms as contrasted with sensible reality. 
 Having contended that divine nous cannot make plans concerning the physical world 
because it cannot even entertain thoughts about sensible reality, Plotinus goes on to offer a series 
of three arguments for the further claim that nous cannot indeed engage in planning (logismos) 
and foresight (proorasis) about anything whatsoever, since its nature is incompatible with these 
modes of thought. The series begins with a brief and elliptical argument (VI.7.1.32-35) for the 
claim that god could have no need of planning and foresight. Planning, he suggests, is useful 
only for those who are in the epistemically deficient position of not knowing what is to be 
done.18 Similarly, foresight is a cognitive power that would be superseded by something better.19 
The thrust of these suggestions is that if divine nous had to plan out the cosmos and (in doing so) 
to foresee future events, this would imply that it is in the position of a practical agent who must 
have recourse to deliberation; which in turn implies (unacceptably) not only that divine nous is in 
an inferior epistemic position, but also that it exercises powers whose utility is altogether 
obviated by its comprehensive theoretical knowledge (see C2 above).  
This second argument prepares the way for two further arguments directly contending 
that divine cognition is incompatible with the sort of reasoning involved in planning. According 
to the third argument (VI.7.1.36ff.), planning and forethought necessarily involve consideration 
of alternative states of affairs; as Plotinus puts it, planning necessarily involves deliberative 
thoughts of the form “X rather than Y” (or “X in order that not Y”). To arrive at (or possess) 
such a reasoned preference entails the availability of the two alternatives, X and Y, for 
consideration. Plotinus contends, however, that in any case where planning might seem 
appropriate, there will be only one object (say, X) present within the ambit of divine 
apprehension. Therefore nous cannot plan. The argument as it stands is severely compressed, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This is a familiar Plotinian point: III.2.1.10-13; IV.3.18.1-7; IV.4.6.10-13; IV.4.12.1-29; IV.8.8.13-16; V.8.4.36-
38. 
19 Presumably, what is meant is contemplation (theôria); cf. the claim that nature governs the cosmos by 
contemplation, III.8.1ff. 
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there is a question as to how best to construe the basis for the contention that for any two genuine 
alternatives X and Y, there is in nous only X or Y (and not both). On one prominent reading, 
nous faces no such alternatives because everything in nous is necessary rather than contingent.20 
We agree that there are no contingencies or open possibilities in nous (indeed, this much is 
implied by Plotinus’ denial of alternatives in nous). However, Plotinus does not deny the 
existence of alternatives in nous by adverting specifically to modal considerations, and we favour 
a reading that does not require an additional, implicit appeal to the necessity of nous’ thought-
contents. Recall that on Plotinus’ theory of nous, nous’ objects of thought are the actual beings it 
knows (see C2). So nous’ thoughts will consist just in thought of what is actual. On this view, 
nous cannot think ‘X, so that not Y’ or ‘there would have been Y, if not X’ for the simple reason 
that unrealised alternatives (Y’s)—precisely insofar as they are unrealised—would be what 
potentially was (or is or will be); and nous thinks only actual beings (X’s). The actuality of 
divine thought thus precludes its entertaining alternatives and so precludes planning. 
In his fourth argument (VI.7.1.45 ff.), Plotinus continues to develop the contrast between 
nous’ thought and deliberative forethought by observing that all the beings of which nous can be 
aware are wholly and simultaneously present to it. So there are, for nous, no prospective (i.e., not 
yet realized) states of affairs to be fore-seen or pre-planned; this much is implied by the complete 
actuality of nous (see C2). Nonetheless, Plotinus vindicates a special sense in which nous might 
be said to exercise foresight (as he affirms it does, ln. 42-43), claiming that ‘the future’ is already 
present in nous in the sense that it comes to be later in time not in nous, but “in another” (i.e. the 
sensible world) “as if it had been planned in advance” (ln. 49-52). Thus, nous ‘foresees’ the 
future just insofar as it knows once and for all the intelligible counterparts of those things that 
come into existence earlier and later in the sensible world.21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For this proposal, see Bréhier vol. 6.2: 44; Thaler 2011: 164-5; and Hadot 1988: 197-9. Hadot takes Plotinus to 
exclude the existence of (future) contingents in nous by way of the argument below (lines 45 ff.) for the thesis that 
all things nous knows are simultaneously present to it (“… le Dieu ne peut raisonner parce qu’il n’y a pas pour lui de 
choix possible, c’est-à-dire parce que tout est en lui présent de manière simultanée.”). Hadot’s construal of the 
development of the passage relies on reading the sentence at lines 42-45 as the question of whether nous exhibits 
foresight rather than as the assertion that it does (cf. Gurtler 2002: 112). But this is linguistically difficult, given the 
adversative force of the phrase (οὐ µὴν ἀλλὰ) that introduces the next argument (see Denniston: 28-30; Smyth 
§2767 [‘nevertheless’]; Kühner-Gerth II, §534.7 [‘jedoch’]) and serves to announce Plotinus’ intention to qualify the 
sense in which nous can be said to exhibit foresight. 
21 One might be tempted to read Plotinus’ claim that the ‘the future’ is already present in nous as the stronger claim 
that nous actually has knowledge of future states of affairs here. Plotinus’ epistemological commitments however 
tell against this stronger reading: given that nous’ knowledge is not of sensible reality (see C1), it cannot strictly 
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Finally, Plotinus presents a fifth argument (VI.7.3.1 ff.) against the proposal that certain 
features of the sensible world might be the products of planning that ‘supplements’ (prostheinai, 
VI.7.2.54) what is already given in the Forms, on the grounds that such supplemental planning is 
incompatible with the eternity of the world (C3).22  As noted above, Plotinus elsewhere points 
out the difficulty in thinking that an eternally existing cosmos was pre-planned, since there was 
no time before the cosmos existed when it could have been planned out. Here he builds on this 
difficulty by confronting the proponent of a planned cosmos with two further problems as to the 
circumstances in which the alleged planning occurred. On the one hand, if the cosmos has 
always been optimally arranged in accordance with an already existing divine plan, then a divine 
craftsman could only engage in planning—that is, in the formulation or discovery of a plan for 
the cosmos—if he had somehow forgotten that previously implemented plan.23 But if on the 
other hand the divine plan is a plan to remedy pre-existing deficiencies in the cosmos, then we 
will be unable to explain why this improvable cosmos had not previously been improved, since 
there was (ex hypothesi) a beneficent cause of good already present to it. Thus, god could relate 
to an eternal cosmos via planning only at the cost of being cognitively imperfect or imperfectly 
good; neither of which alternatives is acceptable. It is worth noting that this final argument also 
excludes the possibility that some divine entity other than nous (e.g. the World Soul or the ‘lesser 
gods’ of the Timaeus) could be responsible for planning permanent features of the cosmos; for 
the same problems can be posed for any such entity.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
speaking know future states of affairs in the sensible world. Contrast e.g. Boethius’ God, whose knowledge is 
completely and eternally present to him, and embraces all states of affairs in the sensible world–past, present, and 
future (De cons. 5.6.1-17).   
22 Thaler 2011: 165-6 rightly notes that the argument targets the idea that creation of sensible kinds involves 
supplementing features given by the Forms with ‘additions or alterations’. The opening lines of the chapter (ln. 1-3) 
may well adumbrate a further criticism of supplemental planning in particular, viz. that such planning of structures 
here would be counterproductive, as it could only serve add or subtract features given in the Form, and so, reduce 
the product’s conformity to its intelligible model. 
23 That is, if he forgot the plan specifying how Forms should be instantiated; contra Hadot 1988: 206, the problem 
envisaged is not that of fallen Demiurge (à la the Gnostics) who must plan because he has forgotten the Forms. See 
preceding note. 
24 Indeed, Plotinus elsewhere stresses that the World-Soul (and Nature) do not deliberate or plan, but rather reflect 
on thought-contents that derive ultimately from divine nous (IV.4.10.6-18; IV.4.11.1-13; IV.4.12.1-29; IV.8.8.13-
16), a fact that underlies Plotinus’ decision to characterise their mode of thought as theôria (III.8.1 ff.). Armstrong 
obscures this point in his translation of III.9.1 by construing the mental activity (dianoeisthai, cf. Tim. 39e9) 
whereby soul undertakes to reproduce what it sees in nous in the sensible cosmos as ‘planning’.  
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Plotinus’ five arguments together constitute a robust case against divine planning of the 
sensible cosmos. Divine nous’ nature implies that it (1) lacks appropriate starting points for 
thinking about the sensible world; (2) is not in a defective cognitive condition where planning 
would be necessary or appropriate; and cannot engage in the consideration of (3) alternatives or 
(4) prospective states of affairs as such, both of which are essential to planning. Furthermore, (5) 
the eternality of the world’s structures is incompatible with these features being planned by 
gods.25 Plotinus accordingly suggests (VI.7.1.28-32) that the terms logismos and proorasis are 
properly used of divine nous to indicate that things here are arranged as someone who reasoned 
about them would have arranged them, not to indicate that god actually engages in logismos or 
literally “fore-sees” what happens here. This comment seems to be intended to legitimise 
Platonic ways of talking. 
 
Providence Without Planning 
 
What room is left for providence by Plotinus’ claim that divine planning is impossible 
(and so a fortiori that it has no causal role in the ordering of the physical world)? Plotinus gives 
his clearest explanation of what he takes providence to be in III.2-3, On Providence, which 
comprises a continuous essay in theodicy. The main purpose of this text is to rebut the claim (put 
in the mouths of Epicureans and Gnostics) that our cosmos is not arranged in the best possible 
way for a thing of its kind. We shall have something to say below about his strategy for this 
rebuttal; what is of immediate interest is the ‘position statement’ that Plotinus stakes out near the 
outset of his discussion. He asserts that providence (pronoia) exists, but warns against 
understanding this assertion to entail that the cosmos has been ordered in accordance with divine 
deliberation or logismos. For the term ‘pronoia’ when applied to nous as the cause of the cosmos 
does not imply that nous is prior to (pro) the cosmos in time (and so that it gives fore-thought to 
the cosmos); indeed, the term does not imply divine thought about the cosmos at all. Rather, the 
term designates the metaphysical priority of nous to the cosmos (III.2.1.21 ff.; cf. VI.8.17.9-12); 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 These considerations may not exhaust Plotinus’ reasons for denying planning to nous. For example, since 
Plotinus’ nous is, like Aristotle’s, unchanging, it cannot engage in a step-by-step process of reasoning (Opsomer 
2005: 84). 
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or, as he puts it in what appears to be his official definition of pronoia, “providence [for the 
physical cosmos] is its being in accordance with nous” (III.2.1.21 f.).26 
It is worth pausing to appreciate just how radically austere an account of providence this 
is. In asserting that divine providence has brought about the best physical cosmos possible, 
Plotinus explicitly refuses to ascribe any planning or supervisory capacity to divine nous with 
regard to that cosmos. For him, to speak of nous as pronoia is simply to point to its causal role 
vis-à-vis the cosmos; one might just as well say that the term properly refers to the katanoetic 
nature (as it were) of the physical world, that is, to the fact the contents and features of this world 
are causally determined by the Forms that nous contemplates.  
It is in the very nature of the Forms to emanate forth from their own being, and in so 
doing to generate the physical world as a reflection and image of themselves. On the austere 
Plotinian picture, whatever exists here in our world is simply a necessary result of that emanation. 
Accordingly, the only form of explanation Plotinus will admit for the world’s containing some 
given formal feature is “[in order] that there shall be everything” (VI.7.3.14 f.), i.e., because 
intelligible reality necessarily gets expressed as fully as possible here in its image (the sensible 
realm). So all things here are present here because they are already present there, among the 
Forms; but, again, they are not present either here or there through divine planning. The benefit 
and welfare of the inhabitants of the physical universe were not (and could not possibly have 
been) taken into account in its creation.27 
 
Problems for Plotinian Providence 
 
This view of providence, according to which all formal features of the sensible cosmos 
have counterparts in nous, faces certain difficulties. To begin with, Plotinus himself identifies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In line with this definition, the World Soul exercises providence in a derivative way, by communicating the 
contents of nous to the sensible world (III.3.4; IV.8.2). 
27 It has been proposed that Plotinus’ austere theory of providence may owe a debt to Alexander’s. For Alexander, 
providence is exercised over the sublunary region by the heavens, whose orderly motions ensure regular processes 
of generation and destruction as well as the permanence of species kinds (Quaestio 1.25 41.4-19 and 2.19 63.10-28 
Bruns; De Prov. 33.1f., 87.5ff. Ruland). Alexander’s view that providence involves no planning anticipates a key 
aspect of Plotinus’ position, but his view as stated accords no prominent role to divine thought. In particular, it is not 
clear whether, for Alexander, divine nous itself (i.e. the Prime Mover) exercises providence (for a negative answer, 
see Sharples 1982: 200-4); or whether Alexander takes the contents of divine thought to determine the structure of 
the cosmos or the natural kinds within it, as Plotinus does. For Alexander, see Sharples 1982, and, for his possible 
influence on Plotinus, Thillet 2003: 46-54, and Chiaradonna 2015 in this volume. 
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two aporiai to the effect that nous’ possession of such counterparts is incompatible with the 
perfection of its thought. It is moreover unclear how to explain the fact that nous contains 
counterparts of structures here in the sensible world that seem optimised for the survival of living 
creatures, given that (on Plotinus’ theory) nous is precluded from giving any thought to the 
conditions of embodied life.  
Let us begin with the two aporiai Plotinus himself discusses.  
First, since nous has counterparts of all things here, there must be a counterpart of sense-
perception in the Form of Man. But if sense-perception, a non-rational cognitive capacity, itself 
has a counterpart in nous, then this threatens to involve nous with a cognitive activity inferior to 
the theôria which alone is proper to it (VI.7.3.22-33; VI.7.4-7). Plotinus addresses this difficulty 
by insisting that the noetic counterpart of sense-perception is not a capacity to apprehend sense-
objects. As designations such as ‘fire’ or ‘horse’ are not applied synonymously to the Forms and 
their participants, Plotinus can reasonably deny that the existence of ‘perception’ in nous 
straightforwardly implies its possession of a capacity to apprehend sense-objects. Moreover, 
since the capacity to perceive sense-objects would be incompatible with nous’ nature as a pure 
intellect, Plotinus has a positive reason to insist that this feature of ‘perception’ here does not 
apply to the noetic counterpart of the same name. Plotinus thus accepts that there must be a 
counterpart of sense-perception in nous that serves as an analogue for the cognitive faculty here 
that is essentially related to sense-objects, without itself standing in a cognitive relation to sense-
objects. To explain how this might be possible, Plotinus proposes that the relation of our non-
rational faculty of sense-perception to perceptible bodies has its analogue in our rational soul’s 
cognitive relation to the noetic counterparts of ‘bodies’ or ‘sensibles’—presumably, what is 
meant here are those Forms that correspond to sensible bodies here, e.g. the Form of Fire28—
whereas the rational soul’s cognitive relation to Forms in nous has as its analogue the cognitive 
relation of the Form of Man to itself (VI.7.6.1-12; VI.7.7.19-31).29 With this proposal, Plotinus 
suggests that counterparts for non-rational faculties can be found in nous without nous itself 
being saddled with non-theoretical capacities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For the suggestion that ‘bodies’ and ‘sensibles’ in nous are to be so understood, see Emilsson 1988: 360-363. 
29 There is a question here about how the cognitive relation of the Form of Man to itself serves to prefigure rational 
soul’s cognitive relation to a plurality of Forms. The answer may lie in Plotinus’ view that each Form, in thinking 
itself, also thinks other Forms, apparently because its comprehensive self-knowledge requires an understanding of 
how it relates to other Forms. 
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Second, there is the aporia that the perfection of nous will apparently be compromised if 
it contains noetic counterparts of inferior sensibles (e.g. ‘worthless’ [eutelês] non-rational 
animals; VI.7.8.15-18, VI.7.9.1-5). Plotinus’ initial line of response to this difficulty is to point 
out that the counterparts of non-rational animals must (in accordance with his theory of nous) be 
intellects and so, far from being worthless, very fine indeed. But he concedes that these intellects 
are presumably inferior to those intellects within divine nous that correspond to rational animals. 
This response shifts Plotinus’ burden to showing that the existence of such inferior intellects in 
nous is consistent with its optimal condition overall. And Plotinus thinks this burden can be met 
by contending that the inclusion of these inferior intellects in nous contributes to its perfection by 
making it complete (‘teleios’, ‘pantelês’; VI.7.10.4-7; VI.7.12.1-4).30  
This appeal to completeness might look like an ad hoc solution to the problem at hand, 
but in fact, the view that the completeness of nous involves an extensive plurality of inferior 
Forms has a firm basis in the principles governing nous’ constitution.31 On Plotinus’ theory, 
there are relations of priority and posteriority within the contents of nous (e.g., each genus is 
prior to its subordinate species), and inferior Forms are a necessary outcome of successive stages 
in the articulation of nous’ contents (VI.7.9.15-20). However, even though these articulations 
bring with them some Forms that are (taken individually) inferior to others, Plotinus has a 
principled explanation of why such articulations are intrinsic to nous’ nature. He contends that an 
object of thought must have some complexity, and so, that some degree of composition in the 
object of thought is a minimal condition on nous’ thinking. But what is crucial for present 
purposes is that Plotinus also takes the minimal differentiation required for thought to 
presuppose a principle responsible for maximal differentiation within nous. 
If it [i.e. nous] has no change in it, and no ‘difference’ wakes it to life, it would not even 
be an activity…. Now certainly what has come to be has come to be from the same and 
the different; and not just any different, but universal difference; for its same is also 
universal. But since it is all that is same and all that is different, there is no one of the 
others that it leaves out. Its nature therefore is to become different in every way. 
(VI.7.13.11-12, 21-25) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Cf. the characterization of the model as a “complete living being” at Tim. 31b.  
31 For these principles, see Rappe 2002, Emilsson 2007: 160-4, and Thaler 2011.   
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In this passage, Plotinus alludes to his interpretation of the five ‘greatest kinds’ at Plato's Sophist 
254b-55e–being, sameness, difference, motion, rest–according to which these generic ‘kinds’ 
serve as primary principles explaining the nature and constitution of nous (II.4.5; V.1.4; VI.2.7-
9). On this interpretation, ‘difference’ is the cause not just of the minimal differentiation in the 
object of thought required for thinking, but also—apparently, because ‘difference’ is universal in 
scope—of comprehensive differentiation in nous’ object. So, on Plotinus’ theory, it follows from 
the basic principles of divine thought that there will be comprehensive differentiation among 
nous’ objects of thought. Thus, Plotinus can reasonably insist that maximal internal 
diversification, together with the existence of inferior Forms it implies, is necessary to the 
completeness of nous’ nature.32  
Thus far, we have focused on a pair of difficulties for the perfection of divine thought 
that Plotinus sees as arising from the thesis that all formal features of the cosmos are prefigured 
in nous. But this thesis might be thought to involve a further problem, one that presents a 
significant obstacle to regarding Plotinus’ theory as a respectable alternative to the natural 
teleology of Aristotle or the Stoics. According to those models of natural teleology, the 
perfection of individual species and the good order of the sensible cosmos as a whole are to be 
explained by reference to the choiceworthy ends their features subtend. Plotinus by contrast 
maintains that although the sensible cosmos and the species within it are optimally constituted, 
their features are fully determined by the contents of a divine mind that cannot take consideration 
of the natural world or of ends internal to that world. How then can Plotinus explain the fact that 
nous possesses those very thoughts that ensure a well-ordered physical cosmos and well-adapted 
organisms, given that it cannot (ex hypothesi) give any thought to the sensible cosmos and the 
conditions of embodied life? If we concede to the Platonist that divine nous cannot think about, 
for example, the utility of eyes and horns for organisms here, can he still tell a plausible story 
about how nous entertains thoughts that guarantee the existence of such useful structures here? 
Plotinus is clearly optimistic that nous’ thoughts ensure an optimal cosmos, albeit without fully 
explaining the grounds for his confidence. In what follows, we will argue that his presentation of 
his theory does suggest one important reason for this optimism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Compare Thaler 2011: 177-9, who proposes that the diversity of living Forms serves the teleological purpose of 
supplying all necessary parts of “the general notion of life” (178). He rightly calls attention to evidence that, for 
Plotinus, each Form contributes to the ‘completeness’ of nous’ life; less clear is whether Plotinus means by this (as 
Thaler proposes) that life is a genus whose existence is dependent on that of all its sub-species.     
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It will be helpful to begin by drawing a distinction between two different possible ways 
of conceiving of the noetic counterparts of things here. On the one hand, Plotinus might think 
that nous contains more or less detailed blueprints for each of the structures here; for example, 
the noetic counterpart of ‘horn’ in the Form of bull might be a specification for a pointy 
keratinous protuberance of the skull of a certain shape and relative size (Option 1). But this 
suggestion is problematic. It is hard to see how nous could be in a position to conclude that just 
this sort of structure is necessary for the completeness of the Form of Bull, given that nous is (ex 
hypothesi) precluded from thinking about the conditions here that make the desirability of a 
structure with just these features intelligible (e.g. defense against predators or competition with 
other members of the herd). On the other hand, Plotinus might think that the noetic counterpart 
of ‘horn’ does not contain a detailed articulation of the features of horn we find here; rather ‘horn’ 
in nous is something that has a function in nous analogous to that of horn here, while the 
structural features of horn here only emerge in the process of emanation (Option 2). We will now 
adduce some textual evidence that lends some support to Option 2, and then consider how 
Option 2 helps Plotinus avoid the problem raised for Option 1.  
As mentioned above, Plotinus appears to hold that the noetic counterpart of the sense-
perceptual apparatus in humans is constituted simply by the cognitive relation of the self-
thinking Form of Man to itself. Similarly, when Plotinus discusses the noetic counterparts of 
horns and claws, he asserts that these are not for defense (a Form, after all, doesn’t need to 
defend itself), but rather serve to make the Form in question self-sufficient (autarkês) and 
complete (teleios) as the kind of ‘living being’ (zôon) it is, viz. as the theoretical intellect in 
question (VI.7.9.39-10.7). The notion that ‘horns’ and ‘claws’ make the Forms in question 
complete is neutral as to what the Form thinks in having these elements. But there is no 
suggestion that ‘horns’ and ‘claws’ are otherwise like the structures of the same name in the 
sensible world, and Plotinus’ treatment of the noetic counterparts of sense-perception (discussed 
above) tends to count against the suggestion that they are. So what we seem to find in nous 
corresponding to claws and horns are features that play the functional roles of providing 
intelligent life, self-sufficiency, and completeness to the Forms, rather than blueprints for 
whatever bodily structures or psychic faculties might best serve to realise the analogues of these 
excellent divine attributes in the sensible world. If this is right, then Plotinus is not committed to 
the implausible position (Option 1) that nous works out in detail structures that will turn out to 
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have utility here without taking into consideration the conditions and ends here with reference to 
which these structures have utility.  
But if the physical structures of such features as ‘eye’ and ‘horn’ are not already worked 
out in nous, as Option 2 would have it, then how do features of nous ensure the existence of such 
useful structures here? Presumably, the answer must be that these features in the sensible world 
come into existence automatically (as it were) as images of the Forms generated though the 
process of emanation. This is not as uninformative a solution as it might seem. Once we accept 
the assumption that the Forms cause (but do not contain detailed specifications of) optimal 
physical structures, the emergence of such structures in the sensible cosmos is secured by the 
Platonist assumption that Forms cause their sensible participants to approximate to the Forms’ 
own perfections. Plotinus can be confident that every species here will turn out to be a successful 
design, since it will necessarily possess whatever physical structures replicate (as far as is 
possible in the physical medium) the completeness, self-sufficiency, and vitality of the Form of 
which it is a likeness.  
 
A Theory of Providence? 
 
  Earlier we observed that Plato characterizes the Demiurge’s thought in relation to the 
physical cosmos as ‘providence’ (pronoia) because the organization and features of the cosmos 
are planned out in advance by the Demiurge. Given Plotinus’ categorical denial that the Platonic 
Demiurge in fact has any plans or concerns whatsoever regarding the cosmos (let alone any with 
temporal priority to it), one might reasonably wonder how he manages to take his theory about 
the causal relationship between divine nous and the physical world to constitute an account of 
providence at all.33 Plotinus no doubt feels some obligation to maintain that the world is under 
the control of providence simply in order to remain exegetically faithful to Plato’s assertions 
about pronoia, and this represents one motivation for his efforts to show that the application of 
the term ‘pronoia’ to divine nous is justified. Thus far, we have seen that Plotinus legitimates 
Plato’s ascription of pronoia to the Demiurge in two ways: (1) pronoia is nous’ being causally 
(but not temporally) prior to (pro) the cosmos; and (2) nous can be said to have foresight in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Cf. Atticus’ complaint that Aristotle, like the Epicureans, effectively does away with providence by denying that 
the gods are interested in human affairs (fr. 3 des Places). 
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sense that it eternally knows the noetic counterparts of what exists both earlier and later in time 
here in the sensible world. That is not the end of the matter, however; Plotinus has a further (and 
more substantial) rationale for framing some of his claims about nous as claims specifically 
about providence.  
Divine pronoia is typically invoked by Plotinus’ Platonist predecessors (as well as by the 
Stoics, who were also in part inspired by the Timaeus) precisely as an explanatory basis for the 
claims (a) that the cosmos is optimally organised and (b) that there is divine justice (i.e. the 
wicked do not go unpunished, nor the virtuous unrewarded).34 So if Plotinus can show that 
divine intellection (as he characterises it) guarantees the truth of both (a) and (b), then he can 
fairly claim to have delivered a story about ‘providence’ to rival those traditional theories that 
appeal to divine planning in order to support the same claims. 
 We have already seen above how Plotinus takes himself to have established (a): all of the 
formal features of natural entities (including those which enable animals to survive and flourish, 
each in its own way) are given in the intelligible content of nous, which is also ultimately 
responsible for their generation (via emanation). It is worth emphasizing that Plotinus will say 
the same thing about the entire physical cosmos itself, taken as a whole: it is the grand product of 
the emanation of the Forms taken together as a whole, and this is precisely what ensures that it is 
optimally organised. In III.2.1, Plotinus characterises the Forms collectively as constituting the 
‘first and truest’ cosmos on account of the fact that the relations that they bear to one another are 
completely harmonious, with no trace of conflict or disunity. This harmonious unity is 
instantiated in the relations among the various parts of the physical world—insofar as such unity 
can be instantiated in the latter’s imperfect material medium—earning it too the title of ‘cosmos’ 
(III.2.2; cf. VI.8.14.25-28). 
This justification of (a) amounts to a reinterpretation of the Platonic Demiurge: given that 
formal causes in nous are alone what determine the best possible state of affairs in the cosmos, 
the theoretic activity of divine intellect yields results that are just the same as—or perhaps even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The association of these claims with the assertion of divine providence was not confined to philosophical circles, 
but enjoyed somewhat wider currency among educated Greeks. See for example Theon, Progymnasmata 126,3-
128,2 (Patillon), where (a) is invoked as a commonplace that an orator could draw upon in support of the thesis that 
“the gods have forethought (pronoousi) for the cosmos” (126,3-4); and Plutarch, De sera 549b-e, where doubt of (b) 
is presented as perennially leading some people to believe that there is no providence.  
	  	   19 
better than—those that would have been brought about by optimal planning.35 In effect, the self-
propagating nature of the good precludes the need for divine benevolence understood as 
goodwill directed towards the world as such; the benevolence of nous on Plotinus’ view just is its 
self-propagating nature, qua good. 
As for (b), Plotinus pursues in III.2-3 a theodical strategy that derives in its broad 
contours from Book 10 of Plato’s Laws. This strategy is too complex to discuss in detail here,36 
but of special note for present purposes is Plotinus’ claim (following Laws 904b-e) that the soul 
of every mortal after death is reincarnated or transposed into a new situation that reflects its 
‘worth’ (axia), and that this new situation itself represents an appropriate reward or punishment 
for its character and conduct in life (III.2.13). Plotinus emphasises that this process of justice via 
reincarnation is built into the orderly arrangement of the world; it does not require special divine 
attention or intervention.37 So souls, which are themselves each co-eternal with the cosmos, are 
fully implicated in the cosmic order; every soul after death comes to be disposed in just the way 
necessitated by that soul’s past lives. The career of every soul is in effect the expression of a law 
that is both unique to itself and part of a natural order that is as just as possible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Plotinus rejects the traditional Platonist conception of the Demiurge of Plato’s Timaeus, 
on which divine nous is understood to cause the physical world to be well-ordered (to be a fine 
kosmos) through deliberation or planning; as we have seen, he argues this conception of the 
Demiurge to be incompatible with certain important commitments (C1-3) that he thinks all 
Platonists should share. He offers an alternative account of divine providence that is interesting 
because of its very austerity. The physical world exists because the Forms necessarily produce it 
by emanation; and the physical world is well-ordered because it is necessarily the physical 
expression of the perfections of the Forms, in all their variety and mutual harmony. Plotinus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See note 7 above.  
36 Plotinus borrows liberally from Stoicism in his theodicy as well; see Bréhier, vol. 3: 17-23. 
37 Claims about justice through reincarnation appear frequently in the Platonic myths (e.g. those in Gorgias, 
Phaedrus, Phaedo, and Republic 10), but Plotinus is apparently interested in a feature unique to the myth of Laws 
10: the process of soul-relocation is there claimed to occur automatically and in accordance with general rules, so 
that the divine administration of the universe is accomplished, as Plato puts it, with “marvellous ease” (904a).
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urges us to interpret all Platonic talk of divine benevolence in terms of the former claim, and all 
Platonic talk of divine craftsmanship in terms of the latter. 
 Plotinus’ account of the Demiurge’s providential activity was to enjoy an influential but 
mixed legacy in Later Antiquity.38 While his position that the cosmos is not the product of divine 
planning would become the predominant view, his denial that the providential deity thinks about 
the sensible cosmos would prove to be too radical a thesis for many of his successors. On these 
points, Proclus is illustrative of broader trends. Proclus wholeheartedly accepts Plotinus’ verdict 
that divine providence involves no deliberation or planning, and to this extent he endorses 
Plotinus’ decisive turn away from the traditional Platonist view.39 On the other hand, Proclus is 
not prepared to follow Plotinus in his insistence that there is no knowledge of the physical world 
on the part of the providential deity. Rather, Proclus contends that providence entails knowledge 
of what falls within the scope of its oversight, and so, knowledge of physical reality, at the level 
not just of kinds but even of particular items and contingent events.40 Here Proclus’ attempt to 
develop an epistemology capable of reconciling the transcendence and immutability of divine 
cognition with the idea that providence does involve thought about our cosmos reflects—at least 
implicitly—a partial acceptance and a partial rejection of Plotinus’ remarkably austere and 
revisionary account of divine pronoia.  
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